August 3, 2000, AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, seventeen (17) pages. NO EXHIBITS SCANNED.; August 7, 2000, AFFIDAVIT NUMBER TWO (2) OF JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS AS TO CORRECTIONS WITHIN AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, DATED AUGUST 3, 2000, two (2) pages. Both the August 3, 2000 AFFIDAVITS were included with the August 15, 2000 filings by Briggs and Morgan to the Clerk of Court. 19 Total pages.
JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS
Plaintiff
vs.
CHARLES W. FAULKNER, SUED AS ESTATE/WILL/BUSINESS INSURANCE OF DECEASED ATTORNEY CHARLES W. FAULKNER
SHEILA REGAN FAULKNER
FAULKNER & FAULKNER, Attorneys at Law
and
JOHN & JANE DOE
Defendants
STATE OF KANSAS
COUNTY OF LEAVENWORTH
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS
COMES NOW the Plaintiff
in the abovestyled action. JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, (hereinafter
LAMBROS), and, after being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. On July 20, 2000, Attorney Stenmoe requested that LAMBROS address
some of the following topics in affidavit form.
2. Attorney Charles W. Faulkner was appointed by the U.S. District
Court and/or the Federal Public Defenders Office in Minnesota to
represent Lambros in U.S. vs. LAMBROS, Criminal Number
4-89-82, on June 22, 1992. See docket sheet entry number four
(4).
3. Lambros was extradited from Brazil to the United States under the
U.S.-BRAZIL EXTRADITION TREATY in U.S. vs. LAMBROS, Criminal
Number 4-89-82.
4. Thirty (30) years is the maximum prison sentence in Brazil.
Article 75 of the Brazilian Criminal Code limits the maximum prison
sentence in Brazil. See, STATE OF WASHINGTON vs. MARTIN SHAW PANG,
940 P.2d 1293, 1352 (Wash. 1997)(Supreme Court of
Washington, En Banc) Denied by the U.S. Supreme Court,
139 L.Ed.2d 608. EXHIBIT A. (PANG, at 1352, offering an overview of
Brazilian
End of page 1
legal journals supporting 30 year maximum prison sentence.)
2. RULE OF LENITY provides that "where text, structure, and
history fail to establish that the Government's position is
unambiguously correct, [courts] apply the RULE OF LENITY and
resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant's] favor." See, U.S.
vs. GRANDERSON, 511 U.S. 399 54 (1994)(citation omitted).
3. DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DOUBT can only be invoked if
two
conditions are satisfied: (1) "the statute must be genuinely
susceptible to two
constructions AFTER, and NOT BEFORE, its complexities are unraveled";
and (2)
a constitutional question not only lacks an obvious answer, but
causes the court
gravely to doubt that a statute, as construed, is constitutional.
See, ALMENDAREZ
TORRES vs. U.S., 118 S.Ct. 1219 (1998).
4. The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides: "[N]o
Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment protects all persons from
arbitrary arrest, INCLUDING PERSONS ARRESTED PURSUANT TO
TREATIES. See, REID vs. COVERT, 354 U.S. 1,
16-18 (1957) (plurality opinion); IN RE AIRCRASH, 684 F.2d
1301, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1982); PLASTER vs. U.S., 720 F.2d 340,
348 (4th Cir. 1983) (the "government must, in carrying out its
TREATY OBLIGATIONS conform its conduct to the requirements
of the CONSTITUTION.")
5. STARE DECISIS is the time-honored principle that
"[questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to
the attention of the court nor RULED UPON, are not to be considered
as having been so decided as to constitute precedents. 11 WEBSTER
vs. FALL, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925); see also U.S. vs. L.A.
TUCKER TRUCK LINES, INC., 344 U.S. 339 38 (1952) ("Even as to our
own judicial power or JURISDICTION, this Court has followed the lead
of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall who held that this Court is not bound
by prior exercise of JURISDICTION in a case where it was not
questioned and it was passed SUB SILENTIO.") Quoting, PARRETTI vs
U.S., 122 F.3d 758, 778 (9th Cir. 1997) (Detention of fugitive
on
End of page 2
Extradition warrant
request WITHOUT BAIL violated due process, absent showing that
fugitive posed flight risk.)
6. On or about January 27, 1994, Lambros was sentenced on Count 1,
Title 21 U.S.C. H 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), & 846, Conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute and distributing more than 5
kilograms of cocaine, to a sentence of MANDATORY LIFE
IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT PAROLE. - Counts 5, 6, & 8, Title 21
U.S.C. H 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), & Title 18 U.S.C. § 2,
AIDING & ABETTING in the knowing and intentionally
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Lambros was
sentenced to a term of prison of 120 months on Counts 5 & 6, to
be served concurrently with Count 1. Lambros was sentenced to a term
of prison of 360 months on Count 8, to be served concurrently with
the sentence on Count 1. A special term of SUPERVISED RELEASE
of 8 years upon release from imprisonment was also
ordered by the court. See,
EXHIBIT B.
(January 27, 1994, JUDGEMENT & COMMITMENT ORDER)
7. On or about February 11, 1997, Lambros was RESENTENCED by Senior
Judge Robert G. Renner on Count 1 to 360 months. All
conditions set forth in the January 27, 1994 sentence remained the
same, including the 8 YEAR SUPERVISED RELEASE to be served
upon release from imprisonment. See,
EXHIBIT -C.
(February 11, 1997, JUDGEMENT & COMMITMENT ORDER)
8. Lambros received a term of 38 years as per the February 11,
1997, RESENTENCING on Counts 1, 5, 6, & 8. This includes the
CONSECUTIVE 8 YEAR SUPERVISED RELEASE to be served upon
release from imprisonment. See, U.S. vs. ROBERTS, 5 F.3d 365,
368-69 (9th Cir. 1993).
9. The Brazilian Supreme Court DID NOT extradite Lambros on Count 9
within Criminal Indictment Number 4-89-82, and Lambros was not
sentenced on January 27, 1994 nor February 11, 1997, on Count 9.
10. Lambros requested Attorney Faulkner to obtain a ruling from the
Court if Count 9 was DISMISSED of if in fact Lambros will have to
leave the United States within 30 days, as per the U.S. -
BRAZIL EXTRADITION TREATY, after release
End of page 3
from prison before a
WARRANT and Indictment 4-89-82 will be reactivated on Count
9. Attorney Faulkner REFUSED to obtain a ruling during PLEA
BARGAINING and at SENTENCING as to the governments position on the
U.S. - BRAZIL EXTRADITION TREATY.
11. Lambros does not believe Attorney FAULKNER nor anyone
within
FAULKNER & FAULKNER RESEARCHED extradition law applicable to the
U.S. - BRAZIL
EXTRADITION TREATY before November 23, 1992, the last day Lambros
could accept
the November 16, 1992, WRITTEN PLEA AGREEMENT, from the Government,
EXCEPT for
those facts and laws outlined within LAMBROS' letter to U.S.
Magistrate Judge
Noel, dated October 16, 1992. See, AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA RAE JOHNSON
dated
August 27, 1999, labeled Exhibits A-27 thru A-31.
12. Lambros does not believe Attorney Faulkner nor anyone within
FAULKNER & FAULKNER RESEARCHED the DOCTRINE OF
SPECIALTY, the DOCTRINE OF DUAL CRIMINALITY, and
the DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE PUNISHMENT before November 23, 1992,
the last day Lambros could accept the November 16, 1992, written plea
agreement from the government, EXCEPT for those facts and law
outlined within Lambros' letter to U.S. Magistrate Judge Noel, dated
October 16, 1992. See, AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA RAE JOHNSON . . ., dated
August 27, 1999, Exhibits A-27-31.
13. Faulkner's motion entitled, "DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR EXTRADITION TREATY VIOLATION," dated December 2, 1992,
contained 55 words within the body of the motion and no case
law and attached LAMBROS' October 16, 1992 letter to U.S. Magistrate
Judge F.L. Noel. Faulkner's motion was submitted after the
government's WRITTEN PLEA AGREEMENT. See, AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA RAE
JOHNSON . ., dated August 27, 1999, Exhibits A-26 thru A-31.
14. U.S. Magistrate Judge Jonathan Lebedoff responded to
FAULKNER'S December 2, 1992, motion entitled, "DEFENDANT'S PRE-TRIAL
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR EXTRADITION TREATY VIOLATION," on December 21,
1992, stating within his REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, "Without
addressing the standing issue, the Court finds that
End of page 4
defendant has FAILED
TO PRESENT A LEGAL ARGUMENT. The clause defendant is relying upon
to invalidate his extradition relates to whether the "legal
proceedings" or the "enforcement of the penalty" for the crime
committed has become barred by limitation. This clause refers to the
statute of limitation for the crime, not whether the penalty is
barred." See, AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA RAE JOHNSON dated August 27, 1999,
Exhibit K-9 and/or December 2, 1992, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION by
U.S. Magistrate Judge Lebedoff, page 9.
15. FAULKNER refused to research and investigate LAMBROS'
experiences
while incarcerated within BRAZILIAN JAILS and PRISONS from on or
about May 17,
1991, the day LAMBROS was arrested in BRAZIL, to on or about June 21,
1992. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated within there opinion,
"[A]lthough a
specific finding on the question whether LAMBROS had been TORTURED
with American
complicity would of been preferable, the state of the records
obviates the need
for remand." See, U.S. vs. LAMBROS, 65 F.3d 698, 701 (8th Cir.
1995) LAMBROS
can state and has proven to this Court that the EIGHTH CIRCUIT has
withheld
evidence and/or did not investigate the facts of his incarceration in
BRAZIL,
as the EIGHTH CIRCUIT stated, "[F]irst, as discussed below,
Lambros' testimony
is UNRELIABLE because he perjured himself in other regards at trial,
and it is
also FANTASTIC. (For instance, Lambros maintains that he was held in
the same
BRAZILIAN CELL where the mistreatment alleged in U.S. vs.
TOSCANINO, 500 F.2d
267 (2nd Cir. 1974), occurred, and EVEN ASSERTS THAT HE MET
TOSCANINO THERE.")
LAMBROS has proved to this Court that FRANCISCO TOSCANINO
was incarcerated with
LAMBROS in BRASILIA, BRAZIL for over FOUR (4) MONTHS and they
did share the same
cell for a few days and lived within the same block of cells,
approximately EIGHTH
(8), for the entire four (4) plus months. LAMBROS has even
offered the name of
FRANCISCO TOSCANINO's attorney in Brazil during that time period to
no avail. See,
U.S. vs. LAMBROS, 65 F.3d at 701 and AMENDED COMPLAINT, dated
February 17, 1999,
EXHIBITS AAA-1 thru AAA-6. WHY HASN'T ANYONE CONTACTED FRANCISCO
TOSCANINO'S
ATTORNEY Dr. Julio Cardella, Rua General Osorio, 939, Campinas, Sao
Paulo, CEP
End of page 5
13.013, Brazil. Phone
number 55-192-340608, as of February 12, 1996. See, Lambros' AMENDED
COMPLAINT, Exhibit AAA-5, (letter from Francisco Toscanino's son,
Maxime Toscanino, to LAMBROS and Attorney Jeff Orren, dated February
12, 1996).
16. FAULKNER refused to contact LAMBROS' attorneys in Brazil or
interview Brazilian witnesses. FAULKNER also refused to hire an
investigator to interview Brazilian witnesses and Lambros' attorneys
in Brazil.
17. On August 11, 1992, Lambros wrote Attorney Dan Scott, Federal
Public Defenders Office, asking why FAULKNER would not request
official transcripts of Lambros' legal proceedings from the Supreme
Court of Brazil or the U.S. Embassy in Brazil. FAULKNER refused to
assist Lambros in obtaining the transcripts from the Brazilian
Supreme Court. See, AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA RAE JOHNSON IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO DISMISS OR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT AND OPPOSING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION, dated August 27, 1999, Exhibits A-13, 14, &
15.
18. FAULKNER refused to request Court funding for independent
psychologists and set-up medical exams as per Lambros' initial
requests. On or about November 9, 1992, Lambros wrote FAULKNER
requesting private psychiatric exam(s) as per the request and
information faxed to FAULKNER by Attorney Jeff Orren. FAULKNER
refused to schedule a psychiatric exam. See, AFFIDAVIT OF DONNA
RAE JOHNSON . . ., dated August 27, 1999, Exhibit A-14.
19. FAULKNER only filed ONE (1) NOTION during the trial of
LAMBROS,
as per docket sheet entries 42 (01/04/93) thru 55 (01/15/93).
See, DOCKET SHEET
entry 48.
20. FRANCISCO TOSCANINO was held with LAMBROS in Brasilia,
Brazil
awaiting EXTRADITION TO ITALY.
21. FAULKNER wrote LAMBROS on November 17, 1992, as to the results of
his NEGOTIATIONS for a plea agreement with U.S. Attorney HEFFELFINGER
and U.S. Assistant Attorney PETERSON. FAULKNER stated that the plea
"AVOIDS THE MANDATORY LIFE COUNT." FAULKNER also
stated, "MY BEST ADVICE GIVEN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES
End of page 6
IS THAT YOU SHOULD ACCEPT
THIS OFFER. YOU MUST CONTACT ME TO DO SO BEFORE NOVEMBER 23,
1992."
22. The November 16, 1992 letter from the U.S. Attorney's Office
which included the governments WRITTEN PLEA PROPOSAL
was attached to FAULKNER's November 17, 1992 letter to LAMBROS.
Please note that the U.S. Attorney's Office stated to FAULKNER,
"[E]nclosed please find the government's written plea
proposal consistent with our DISCUSSIONS WITHIN THE
LAST TEN (10) DAYS."
23. LAMBROS believes that the U.S. Attorney would of offered
LAMBROS a plea agreement of one (1) to four (4) years, as it is
LAMBROS belief, the most any defendant received within the indictment
was four (4) years, if both FAULKNER and the U.S. Attorney had
RESEARCHED and/or INVESTIGATED the U.S. - BRAZIL
EXTRADITION TREATY, BRAZILIAN LAW, LAMBROS TORTURE AND FORCED BRAIN
CONTROL IMPLANTATION IN BRAZIL, and the effects of the U.S. PAROLE
COMMISSION WARRANT and/or DETAINER which now brings
LAMBROS sentence "IN CUSTODY" up to 55J YEARS from the
MAXIMUM of THIRTY (30) YEARS, AS PER BRAZILIAN LAW.
Therefore, the MAXIMUM SENTENCE LAMBROS could of
received from the Court is SEVEN AN ONE-HALF
(71)
YEARS
years due to the U.S. Parole Commission detainer that has
been served and validated against LAMBROS, a total amount of
incarceration EXPOSURE LESS THAN any other
defendant named within the indictment. LAMBROS received an
EIGHT (8) YEAR CONSECUTIVE Supervised Release term to
be served upon release from imprisonment. The U.S. Parole Commission
Detainer is 141 YEARS.
24. Lambros has BRAIN CONTROL IMPLANTS
imbedded within his skull that control Lambros' thoughts, deeds,
speech, body movements, etc. During plea bargain negotiations LAMBROS
was instructed by the persons controlling him from BRAZIL not to
except the plea bargain as the United States Government is trying to
COVER-UP the torture, forced brain control implantation, denial of
due process in BRAZIL, and other acts of criminal conspiracy against
LAMBROS.
25. Lambros would of accepted a plea bargain of NOLO CONTENDERE
End of page 7
as to the drug indictment
and/or pled guilty to Conspiracy to defraud IRS lawful functions,
Title 18 U.S.C. Section 371, the same as CO-DEFENDANT PAMELA RAE
LEMON in the amount of one (1) to two (2) years if the government
would of removed the brain control implants from LAMBROS and exposed
the truth of LAMBROS' torture and denial of due process in BRAZIL.
CO-DEFENDANT PAMELA RAE LEMON received a sentence of TWO
(2) MONTHS WITH WORK RELEASE AND SUPERVISED RELEASE TERM OF TWO (2)
YEARS. See, PAMELA RAE LEMON'S Docket Sheet entry number seven
(7) dated December 8, 1989.
26. At the time of plea bargaining, LAMBROS was not educated in law
nor had access to a law library, thus the plea of LAMBROS' would of
been an uneducated plea with total reliance on Attorney FAULKNER who
did not know the law.
27. LAMBROS is suffering and is being deprived of his most precious
liberty and freedom, as freedom from bodily restraint is at the
"CORE" of liberty. See, FOUCHA vs. LOUISIANA, 504 U.S. 71, 80
(1992).
28. LAMBROS has lost his house and other belonging. Lambros' house at
todays market value is approximately $650,000.00.
29. LAMBROS' "LOSS OF PROFITS" include at the minimum his
NON
FUNCTIONING and loss of contracts within the following careers and
professions
that LAMBROS functioned and generated PROFITS within: (a) licensed
U.S. Stock
broker; (b) U.S. and State of Minnesota approved Commodities trader
and consultant
that was sponsored for testing by the Cargil Corporation within the
Minneapolis
Grain Exchange in Minnesota; (c) investment banker that functioned in
the U.S.,
Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Japan, China, Sweden, and Russia; (d)
diamond consultant,
education including passing of all home study programs in the area of
diamonds
from the worlds leading school in diamond education, the Gemological
Institute
of America in California; (e) Psychoanalysis Consultant, education
included
certification from the United States Department of Justice three (3)
year program.
(a/k/a/ "SOCIAL ENGINEERING SKILLS"). See, "PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
ALTER THE
End of page 8
PLEADINGS IN THIS MATTER
AS PER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE JOHN M. MASON'S ORDER, DATED
OCTOBER 15, 1998, dated November 4, 1998, pages 19 and 20.
30. LAMBROS contacted NATIONAL LEGAL PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATES in
Cincinnati, Ohio, to assist in the analysis and research of his
criminal indictment
as FAULKNER was not researching and investigating the matters within
the criminal
proceedings FAULKNER was representing LAMBROS within. See, ORIGINAL
DECLARATORY
JUDGEMENT ACTION/COMPLAINT dated June 15, 1998, Exhibits B-1, B-2, I,
M-1, &
m-2.
31. LAMBROS' RICO CLAIMS are INCLUSIVE as to ALL CLAIMS WITHIN
THIS ACTION, as to Minnesota Local Rule 10.03 and F.R.C.P. 10(c) as
to ALL FILINGS
in this action and the underlying criminal action that Attorney
FAULKNER represented
LAMBROS within. All parties within this action and those parties that
have
interacted within this action and the original criminal action,
including U.S.
Government Officials, witnesses, Brazilian Government Officials,
National Legal
Professional Associates, and others, known and unknown, TRANSMITTED
INFORMATION
VIA INTERSTATE COMMUNICATION FACILITIES INCLUDING U.S. MAIL
AND TELEPHONES
LAMBROS and others RELIED ON FAULKNER'S et al. STATEMENTS AS TO THE
PLEA AGREEMENT
AND LEGAL ADVICE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER TRIAL. LAMBROS also
includes the
information contained within his AFFIDAVIT form motion, "PLAINTIFF
LAMBROS'
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' SECOND MOTION FOR JUDGEMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
OR SUMMARY
JUDGEMENTS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT. BOTH DATED JANUARY 19, 2000,
dated
February 1, 2000, specifically pages 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 149 &
15. See, EXHIBIT
D. . LAMBROS has reviewed U.S. vs. EISEN, 974 F.2d 246 (2nd Cir.
1992)
(Attorneys, law firm's investigators and its office administrator
were convicted
of RICO violations in connection with firm's fraudulent conduct of
civil litigation
as plaintiff's counsel in personal injury case.) The EISEN case will
assist all
parties within this action as to the mail fraud statute and other
elements of RICO.
Please note that EXHIBIT D. , HAS NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO THIS
COURT due to an
End of page 9
ORDER by this Court that
stopped all proceedings. LAMBROS NOW ENTERS HIS
February 1, 2000 MOTION INTO EVIDENCE AS EXHIBIT D (19 pages
in length)
32. LAMBROS believes the COMMERCIAL LIEN he filed
against Attorney
Charles Faulkner, et al., within this action is valid due to my
reading of the
article "COMMERCIAL LIEN STRATEGY: A 'PRESIDENTIAL' OPINION," by
Alfred Adask
that appeared in the AntiShyster Magazine, P.O. Box 540786, Dallas,
Texas
75334-0786, Volume 3, Number 1, January-February 1993. See,
EXHIBIT E.
Lambros has also researched the law as to the filing and use of
COMMERCIAL LIENS,
locating court decisions that have approved the use of liens as a
self-help
remedy. See, LAKE RIVER CORP. vs. CARBORUNDUM CO., 769 F.2d
1284 (7th Cir. 1985);
U.S. vs. REEVES, 752 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1985) (The Fifth
Circuit DID NOT state
the filing of a "COMMON LAW LIEN" was illegal, it only stated that
the use of a
"COMMON LAW LIEN" in a "CORRUPT" "WITH IMPROPER MOTIVE OR BAD OR EVIL
PURPOSE"
was illegal.)
33. LAMBROS DID NOT file the COMMERCIAL LIEN against Attorney
Faulkner, et al. in this action with any type of improper motive or
bad or evil purpose in mind.
34. The August 16, 1999, AFFIDAVIT of MARC DIERSEN that is filed with
this court is incorrect as to his sworn statement in paragraph five
(5), "Mr. Lambros failed to identify by legal description any real
estate against which he had a claim pending." Lambros identified
within his October 16, 1997, PARTIAL LIST OF PROPERTY TO BE SEIZED
AND HELD IN ESCROW the home of Charles W. Faulkner and Sheila R.
Faulkner, 2680 Sumac Ridge, St. Paul, Minnesota 55110. Property I.D.
Number 363022440030. Marc Diersen DOES NOT state within his
AFFIDAVIT that he has been informed by any State or Federal Official
that COMMERCIAL LIENS are UNLAWFUL. Marc Diersen is the supervisor of
the Abstract Division of the Ramsey County Department of Property
Records and Revenue.
35. LAMBROS has not been informed by any STATE or FEDERAL AGENCY that
his COMMERCIAL LIENS are UNLAWFUL.
End of page 10
36. LAWRENCE RANDALL
PEBBLES was indicted within the same indictment LAMBROS was
indicted within. PEBBLES docket sheet states that
Count 1 within the indictment was DISMISSED on June 5, 1992, docket
sheet
entry number 18. EXHIBIT _F. PEBBLES was not indicted on any of
the
other counts within the indictment.
37. LAMBROS served "REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS FROM LARRY PEBBLES" on
July 28, 1998. The ADMISSIONS verify that PEBBLES was informed
by the U.S. Attorneys Office that he COULD NOT RECEIVE MORE
THAN A LIFE SENTENCE FOR COUNT ONE (1) WITHIN INDICTMENT NUMBER
4-89-82. THE SAME COUNT ONE (1) THAT THE U.S. ATTORNEYS OFFICE
AND FAULKNER INFORMED LAMBROS THAT HE COULD ONLY RECEIVE A
MANDATORY LIFE SENTENCE WITHOUT PAROLE.
38. PAMELA RAE LEMON was indicted within Counts 1, 5,
& 6 of the same indictment LAMBROS was indicted within. On
December 8, 1989, the Court DISMISSED all counts against LEMON. LEMON
pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud IRS lawful functions, Title 18
U.S.C. §371 and was sentenced to a term of TWO (2) MONTHS
with work release and supervised release term of two (2) years.
See, Docket Sheet entry no. 7. EXHIBIT - G.
39. RALPH A14ERO was indicted within COUNTS 1, 2, &
3 of the same
indictment LAMBROS was indicted within. On May 1, 1991, Judge Murphy
DISMISSED
all counts and the indictment against AMERO. See docket sheet entry
two (2).
EXHIBIT H.
40. IRA JAY BERINE was indicted within Counts I & 7
of the same indictment LAMBROS was indicted within. On July 26,
1991, Counts 1 and 7 were DISMISSED by the court. BERINE pled guilty
to an INFORMATION FILED on 5/17/91, to Title 21 U.S.C. Section
§843(b) and §843(c) and received a term of imprisonment of
FOURTEEN (14) MONTHS, with a supervised release of 3 years.
EXHIBIT I.
41. GEORGE FREDERICK ANGELO's docket sheet indicates that a
warrant is still pending for his arrest. EXHIBIT J.
End of page 11
42. LAMBROS does not
believe PAMELA RAE LEMON committed any violations of Title 18
U.S.C. §371, as LAMBROS lived with LEMON and assisted her in her
stock purchase decisions and profits and loss of same. LAMBROS
knows of no time that LEMON ever wanted to deceive the IRS nor
has LAMBROS ever suggested any type of deception to LEMON as to
filings with the IRS.
43. On August 13, 1997, LAMBROS attempted to file a TORT CLAIM
against Attorney FAULKNER pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §2675(a)
with Attorney
Daniel M. Scott, Federal Public Defender, Suite 107, U.S. Courthouse,
300 South
Fourth Street, Minneapolis, Minnesota. On August 18, 1997, Attorney
Scott wrote
LAMBROS and returned LAMBROS TORT CLAIM, stating Attorney FAULKNER
was an Attorney
in PRIVATE PRACTICE during his representation of LAMBROS and PAID AN
HOURLY
BILLING RATE BY HIS OFFICE. Attorney Scott also stated that FERRI vs.
ACKERMAN,
100 S.Ct. 402 (1979) made clear that FEDERALLY APPOINTED COUNSEL IS
SU&JECT TO
SUIT FOR MALPRACTICE If the suit is not filed within the time limit
set
by law then the Court will be denied the jurisdiction to provide any
relief.
See, EXHIBIT A within LAMBROS' June 15, 1998, ORIGINAL DECLARATORY
JUDGEMENT/
COMPLAINT within this above-entitled action.
44. DISCOVERY was requested by LAMBROS on January 20, 2000, as
to EXPERT WITNESSES as to PRETRIAL SCHEDULING as per Rule 16 and Rule
26(a)(2)(A) and (B), in the form of a motion entitled, "PLAINTIFF'S
RESPONSE TO COURT'S ORDER DATED DECEMBER 22, 1999, REGARDING
DISCOVERY AND EXPERT WITNESSES, SO COURT MAY ISSUE A PRETRIAL
SCHEDULING ORDER AS PER RULE 16 AND RULE 26(a)(2)(A) and (B)." The
Motion was twenty (20) pages in length with EXHIBITS containing
fortyseven (47) pages. LAMBROS requests this Motion to be allowed
with a SUPPLEMENT from LAMBROS' attorney, due to
LAMBROS uneducated understanding of the law.
45. NEW DEFENDANTS RULING was requested by LAMBROS on January
6, 2000, within LAMBROS' motion entitled, "PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A
RULING BY THIS COURT AS TO THE ADDITION OF NEW DEFENDANTS'
WITHIN THIS ACTION DUE TO AFFIDAVITS AND EXHIBITS
INTRODUCED BY DEFENDANTS ON AUGUST 30, 1999, SO AS TO
PRESERVE
End of page 12
PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS UNDER RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL,
IN THIS ACTION." LAMBROS will be requesting his attorney to
supplement this motion and request this Court to make a ruling as to
same. LAMBROS is now requesting his attorney to supplement the above
stated motion within this paragraph as to this AFFIDAVIT.
46. CLAIM 16 was submitted by LAMBROS to Attorney STENMOE for
filing within this action on March 16, 2000, via U.S. Certified Mail.
Claim 16 is entitled, "PLAINTIFF LAMBROS WAS DENIED A JURY
INSTRUCTION ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE IS CHARGED, AS EVIDENCE WOULD OF PERMITTED
JURY RATIONALLY TO FIND PLAINTIFF LAMBROS GUILTY OF LESSER OFFENSE
AND ACQUITTED OF GREATER OFFENSE. See, Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Rule 31(c), Title 18, U.S.C.A."
47. EXHIBIT K. , contains LAMBROS' March 16, 2000,
letter to
Attorney STENMOE (2 pages); LAMBROS' motion, "PLAINTIFF LAMBROS
REQUESTS LEAVE
OF THE COURT TO AMEND THIS PLEADING TO ADD NEW CLAIM THAT RELATES
BACK TO
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 15(a),
THIS NEW
CLAIM IS 116 AND TO BE ADDED TO PLAINTIFF'S FEBRUARY
17, 1999, AMENDED COMPLAINT.",
dated March 1, 2000 (5 pages in length); and LAMBROS' motion to
be submitted
to the court entitled, "LEGAL CASES TO SUPPORT LAMBROS' RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT PLEA BARGAINING IN CORRECTLY ADVISING
LAMBROS OF POTENTIAL
MAXIMUM SENTENCE.", dated February 1, 2000 (4 pages in length).
48. ATTORNEY JOSEPH S. FRIEDBERG submitted an AFFIDAVIT to
this court dated June 29, 2000. Attorney FRIEDBERG stated, "[Mlr.
LAMBROS' conviction and sentence are not the result of any
shortcomings on the part of his appointed counsel
[FAULKNER]." LAMBROS believes that Attorney FRIEDBERG has
VOLUNTARILY acted to DECEIVE THIS COURT, that may be a
State cause of action as per Minnesota Stat. Ann. H 481.07-.071 (West
1990). See, HANDEEN vs. LEMAIRE, 112 F.3d 1339, 1355 (8th
Cir. 1997). LAMBROS offered a comprehensive overview of caselaw
that
End of page 13
supports Attorney
FAULKNER'S liability under violations of (a) improper conclusions of
law, (b) violations of professional standards, (c) Rule 11(c) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, due to FAULKNER'S inability to
know and/or understand the statute of law LAMBROS was indicted under,
offered a plea agreement on, and sentenced under, in which the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals OVERTURNED. See, pages 14, 15, 16,
& 17 within LAMBROS' May 11, 1999, "PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT, MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT AND REQUESTED ORDER DATED APRIL, 26, 1999." Attorney JOSEPH
S. FRIEDBERG is listed within the telephone directory as officing
at
250 Second Avenue, South, Suite 205, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55401.
EXHIBIT.
(Pages 14, 15, 16, & 17 as described above).
49. PAROLE VIOLATION: On August 21, 1989, the U.S. Parole
Commission issued a WARRANT for the arrest of
LAMBROS as per past federal charges on 04/22/76 and 02/15/77. LAMBROS
was arrested on the August 21, 1989, U.S. Parole Commission WARRANT
on May 17, 1991, in BRAZIL. On April 30, 1992, the BRAZILIAN SUPREME
COURT DID NOT grant extradition on the August 21, 1989,
U.S. Parole Commission WARRANT/DETAINER. LAMBROS was told by
his BRAZILIAN ATTORNEYS and the U.S. EMBASSY that the
August 21, 1989, U.S. Parole Commission WARRANT/ DETAINER COULD
NOT be executed or used against LAMBROS if LAMBROS was not
granted extradition on the WARRANT/DETAINER by the Brazilian Supreme
Court. FAULKNER told LAMBROS that he DID NOT represent LAMBROS
on the August 21, 1989, U.S. Parole Violation Warrant and that it
COULD NOT be executed if the Brazilian Supreme
Court DID NOT extradite LAMBROS on it. LAMBROS believes that
FAULKNER had not researched the law and consulted with U.S. Attorney
Thomas B. Heffelfinger and U.S. Assistant Attorney Douglas R.
Peterson as to the August 21, 1989, U.S. Parole Commission
Warrant/Detainer being enforced. On January 20, 1993, U.S. Attorney
Thomas B. Heffelfinger and U.S. Assistant Attorney Douglas R.
Peterson submitted the "GOVERNMENT REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S MID-TRIAL
MOTIONS," to the Court, which clearly stated, "LAMBROS can still be
charged for ANY PRIOR CRIMES; HE
End of page 14
JUST MUST BE GIVEN
AIR OPPORTUNITY TO LEAVE THE JURISDICTION BEFORE THESE CASES CAN GO
FORWARD. See, Treaty of Extradition, ARTICLE XXI
(Motions Hearing Exhibit)." Id. at page 5. See, AFFIDAVIT OF
DONNA RAE JOHNSON IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS OR SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT AND OPPOSING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, EXHIBIT A- 6.
50. On June 13, 2000, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals AFFIRMED
the 5,357 day U.S. Parole Commission DETAINER
of August 21, 1989, to be a consecutive "IN CUSTODY"
sentence to be served by LAMBROS. See, LAMBROS vs. BOOKER, et
al., No. 00-3118. LAMBROS is now serving a term of "IN CUSTODY"
imprisonment of FIFTY-TWO AN ONE-HALF (52J) YEARS. The
August 21, 1989 DETAINER is to be served as a CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCE.
51. An individual whose PROBATION or PAROLE is being
revoked is entitled to certain due process protections, including
"A WRITTEN STATEMENT BY THE FACTFINDERS AS TO THE EVIDENCE RELIED
ON AND THE REASONS FOR the revocation. See, MORRISSEY vs.
BREWER, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)(Parole); U.S. vs. SMITH,
767 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1985) (Failure of district court to
make WRITTEN STATEMENT for reasons for revoking
probation [Parole] and of evidence relied upon in making
revocation decision violated defendant's DUE PROCESS rights and
REQUIRED A REMAND TO MAKE SUCH A WRITTEN STATEMENT.)
The rational for imposing the "WRITTEN STATEMENT"
requirement is to insure fact-finding and to assist in
judicial review of the revocation decision. See, BLACK vs. ROMANO,
471 U.S. 606, 613- 14 (1985).
52. CLAIM SEVENTEEN (17): LAMBROS will be requesting his
Attorney for assistance in developing what LAMBROS' believes to be
CLAIM 17, as to the June 26, 2000 decision by the U.S. Supreme
Court in APPRENDI vs. NEW JERSEY, Case No. 99-478,
where the Supreme Court stated, "[I]t is unconstitutional
for a legislature to REMOVE FRO14 THE JURY the
assessment of facts that increases the prescribed range of penalties
to which a criminal defendant
End of page 15
is exposed. It is equally
clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a
REASONABLE DOUBT." See, Page 24, OPINION TO THE COURT.
53. On June 29, 2000, in JONES vs. U.S., Case No. 99-8176.
the U.S. Supreme Court VACATED and REMANDED to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals
for further consideration in light of APPRENDI vs. NEW
JERSEY, Case No. 99-478.
Also see, U.S. vs. CARLESS JONES, 194 F.3d 1178 (November 12,
1999, 10th Cir.).
54. On July 18, 2000, the EIGHTH CIRCUIT ruled on U.S. vs.
SHEPPARD, 2000 WL 988127, stating, "[W]e conclude that
DRUG QUANTITY MUST OFTEN BE TREATED AS AN ELEMENT OF THE
OFFENSE UNDER 1841 but that any error was harmless in this case
because the INDICTMENT charged Sheppard with conspiring to distribute
more than 500 grams, and THE JURY NADE A SPECIAL FINDING
OF THAT QUANTITY. "
55. Honorable U.S. District Court Judge Diana E. Murphy, stated the
following during the JUDGE'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
on January 15, 1993, in U.S. vs. LAMBROS, criminal no.
4-89- 82(05), transcript Volume VII, pages 924 thru 960, that
FAULKNER represented LAMBROS within:
56. An INDICTMENT is only a formal method of accusing a defendant of
a crime. It is NOT EVIDENCE of any kind. The defendant has
pled "NOT GUILTY" to the charges. This plea puts in issue EACH of the
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSES and
imposes on the Government the burden of establishing EACH
ELEMENT beyond REASONABLE DOUBT. See, Transcript pages 934
& 935.
57. Also, the evidence NEED NOT PROVE THE ACTUAL AMOUNT OF THE
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE THAT WAS PART OF THE ALLEGED TRANSACTION
OR THE EXACT AMOUNT OF THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
ALLEGED AS POSSESSED BY THE DEFENDANT with the intent to
distribute. The Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt,
however that a measurable amount of the controlled substance was, in
fact, knowingly and intentionally possessed by the defendant with the
intent to distribute. See, Transcript page 935.
End of page 16
58. A form of verdict has been prepared for your use, and you'll
be taking it with you to the jury room. It bears the name of the case
- - that's
the name of the parties and file number - - and reads as follows:
"We, the jury,
find the defendant" - - blank; under the blank is "Guilty" or "Not
Guilty" - -
as charged in Count I of the indictment"; "as charged in Count II of
the indictment";
blank, "as charged in Count III of the indictment"; blank, "as
charged in Count
IV of the indictment." Then there's a line for a date and a line for
the
signature of the foreperson. See, Transcript page 951.
59. EXHIBIT M. , (Transcript pages 934, 935, & 951).
60. 1 JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, declare under penalty of perjury that the
foregoing is true and correct as per Title 28 U.S.C.A.
§1746.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT ON THIS 3rd day of August, 2000.
Signed: John Gregory Lambros
Notarized
End of Affidavit
JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS
Plaintiff
vs.
CHARLES W. FAULKNER, SUED AS ESTATE/WILL/BUSINESS INSURANCE OF DECEASED ATTORNEY CHARLES W. FAULKNER
SHEILA REGAN FAULKNER
FAULKNER & FAULKNER, Attorneys at Law
and
JOHN & JANE DOE
Defendants
STATE OF KANSAS
COUNTY OF LEAVENWORTH
AFFIDAVIT NO. TWO (2) OF JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS AS TO CORRECTIONS WITHIN AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, DATED AUGUST 3, 2000.
COMES NOW the Plaintiff
in the abovestyled action. JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, (hereinafter
LAMBROS), and, after being duly sworn, deposes and says:
1. On August 03, 2000 LAMBROS swore and deposed an AFFIDAVIT
in this above-entitled action that was seventeen (17) pages in length
and contained
sixty (60) numbered paragraphs. Exhibits where also attached.
2. LAMBROS mailed his August 03, 2000 AFFIDAVIT to Attorney Stenmoe
on August 04, 2000 via U.S. Certified Mail.
3. LAMBROS reviewed his AFFIDAVIT on August 05, 2000, and noticed the
following ERRORS due to typing mistakes.
4. In PARAGRAPH TWENTY-THREE (23) of LAMBROS' August 03, 2000,
AFFIDAVIT the number 551 appears. The number should read 52j.
5. Paragraph twenty-three (23) within LAMBROS August 03, 2000,
AFFIDAVIT should read: "[L]AMBROS believes that the U.S.
Attorney would of offered LAMBROS a plea agreement of one (1) to four
(1) years, as it is LAMBROS' belief,
End of page 1
the most any defendant received within the indictment was four (4)
years, if both FAULKNER and the U.S. Attorney had RESEARCHED and/or
INVESTIGATED the U.S. - BRAZIL EXTRADITION TREATY, BRAZILIAN
LAW, LAMBROS' TORTURE AND FORCED BRAIN CONTROL IMPLANTATION IN
BRAZIL, and the effects of the U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION WARRANT
and/or DETAINER which now brings LAMBROS' sentence "IN
CUSTODY" up to 521 YEARS from the MAXIMUM of
THIRTY (30) YEARS, AS PER BRAZILIAN LAW. Therefore, the
MAXIMUM SENTENCE LAMBROS could of received from the
Court is SEVEN AN ONE- HALF (7 1/2) YEARS due to the
U.S. Parole Commission detainer that has been served and validated
against LAMBROS, a total amount of incarceration EXPOSURE
LESS THAN any other defendant named within the
indictment. LAMBROS received an EIGHT (8) YEAR CONSECUTIVE
Supervised Release term to be served UPON RELEASE from
imprisonment. The U.S. Parole Commission Detainer is 141
YEARS."
6. The above 521 YEARS LAMBROS is currently "IN CUSTODY"
serving is due to the THIRTY (30) YEARS PLUS EIGHT (8) YEAR
CONSECUTIVE SUPERVISED RELEASE SENTENCE in U.S. vs. LAMBROS,
Criminal No. 4-89-82 and the FOURTEEN AN ONE-HALF (14J) YEAR U.S.
PAROLE COMMISSION DETAINER. Therefore, 30+8+14 1/2=52 1/2.
7. Lambros is currently "IN CUSTODY" for TWENTY-TWO AN ONE-HALF
(221) YEARS MORE than the MAXIMUM THIRTY (30) YEAR SENTENCE
ALLOWED IN BRAZIL, AS PER ARTICLE 75 OF THE BRAZILIAN CRIMINAL CODE.
See, STATE OF WASHINGTON vs. MARTIN SHAW PANG, 940 P.2d
1293, 1352 (Washington Supreme Court, En Banc), DENIED by the
U.S. Supreme Court, 139 L.Ed.2d 608.
8. Therefore, if LAMBROS is in custody for twenty-two an one-half
(22J) years more than allowed, LAMBROS' sentence should be no more
that SEVEN AN ONE-HALF (71) YEARS in U.S. vs. LAMBROS,
Criminal No. 4-89-82. The criminal proceedings FAULKNER, et al.
represented LAMBROS within. (30- 22 1/2=7 1/2 years).
9. 1 JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS, declare under penalty of perjury that
the foregoing is true and correct as per Title 28 U.S.C.A.
§1746.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NOT ON THIS 7th day of August,
2000.
Web site: www.brazilboycott.org
Signed: John Gregory Lambros
Reg. No. 00436-124
P.O. Box 1000, Leavenworth, Kansas 66048-1000 USA
End of page 2
For more information write (snail mail) JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS directly at:JOHN GREGORY LAMBROS
Prisoner No. 00436-124
U. S. Penitentiary Leavenworth
PO Box 1000
Leavenworth, KS 66048-1000
USATHANK YOU FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND ASSISTANCE IN MY BOYCOTT OF BRAZILIAN PRODUCTS.